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Elections are a major component of democratic political systems. According 
to the main theories of democracy, no system can be considered democratic 
in the absence of elections (or some form of direct democracy, like a refer-
endum) held under universal suf frage. There seems to be an agreement that 
in every democratic political setting, the function of elections goes beyond 
filling posts with candidates. Elections, furthermore, may play a key role in 
non-territorial autonomies (NTA), the general model of which (with its 
strong focus on individual participation) may be suitable for territorially 
dispersed minorities in particular. Since this kind of autonomy arrange-
ment aims to cover those who belong to a certain group irrespective of its 
place of residence and size, there needs to be at least one institution that 
unites and organizes members of the group – an institution established 
in public or private law.
As an inevitable consequence of the dissolution of the former dynas-
tic and multi-ethnic empires and communist multi-national federations, 
a considerable number of such minority communities live in central and 
eastern Europe despite the homogenization policies of the last century. In 
creating their autonomy frameworks several countries in the region, most 
prominently Russia (Osipov 2010), refer to the notion of NTA in their 
legislation, and in public opinion this implies that special associations must 
be endowed with such public functions as maintaining educational and 
cultural institutions. In practice, this idea has been barely implemented. 
Besides, since membership in an association is voluntary, such an approach 
immediately poses the question of legitimacy in at least two ways: for a vol-
untary organization it is more dif ficult to reach the less active and commit-
ted members of the group; furthermore, the great number of associations 
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might easily undermine the potential for the autonomous organizations to 
represent the minority in interactions with the state authorities (Brunner, 
and Küpper 2002: 27).
Other countries, such as Estonia, Hungary, and some of the former 
Yugoslav republics, namely Croatia, Serbia, and Slovenia, represent a 
dif ferent model, whereby registered minority voters are granted the right 
to establish new types of institutions by direct or indirect elections. These 
minority bodies, unlike appointed representatives or voluntary organiza-
tions, are more accountable to the people; thus, they are deemed to be more 
democratic. For the Austro-Marxist theorists – both Otto Bauer (2000: 
281) and Karl Renner (2005: 26) – elections were central to the process 
of establishing non-territorial cultural autonomy. Both in theory and in 
practice, however, this kind of institutional setting raises questions about, 
firstly, who belongs to the given minority and who does not, and, secondly, 
how this should be appraised. Although it is evident that the formal elec-
toral procedure itself lends some legitimacy to the elected bodies (and the 
need for a legitimate leadership was an important concern in choosing this 
institutional form), the term ‘legitimacy’ nevertheless gains an additional 
meaning in its application to community legitimacy in the minority con-
text. This also relates to how and whether minority constituents perceive 
their representatives as legitimate.
Other than their importance in providing legitimacy, little is known 
about the role played by elections in intra-community relations. Yet elec-
toral systems and rules are far from neutral; all of them have a political 
or social bias, favouring certain groups over others at a given time. The 
issue is particularly important, since many scholars have pointed out that 
choosing an electoral system is not only about the electoral process, but 
also about competing normative values. As such, the decision is one of the 
most important in a democracy. A recurring question is whether the logic 
of regular parliamentary and municipal elections is ref lected in minor-
ity elections and how this can be conceptualized in minority contexts. 
Concerning the existing elected NTA systems, very little research has been 
carried out to explore the logic and process of candidate selection, the rela-
tionship between minority constituents and representatives, the impact 
of the electoral system on intra-community dimensions and dynamics. 
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Moreover, there is a significant lack of research data on how the electoral 
system and its incentives shape voting behaviour, on voters’ perceptions 
of the electoral system, on whether it generates a more stable or divided 
leadership and moderates or encourages competition and internal rivalry. 
Future areas of research also need to address the issue of whether propor-
tional electoral systems are more representative and can more ef fectively 
reduce intra-community rivalries or whether, on the contrary, they foster 
dif ferences among subgroups.
Moving from a general perspective to a more specific one, follow-
ing a brief overview of other relevant NTA cases, the present study nar-
rows the focus to the elections of minority self-governments (MSGs) in 
Hungary, one of the first and classic examples of autonomy arrangements 
in the region following the fall of the communist regimes. It uses the major 
functions of elections (Katz 1997) as an analytical tool to assess whether 
and to what extent the minority elections between 1994 and 2010 met 
the requirements of democratic elections. The article, by presenting data 
based on electoral statistics, examines whether and how the main functions 
of elections – legitimating, installation of of ficials, selection and choice 
from alternatives, representation, and increasing participation – can be 
conceptualized and understood in special minority elections. Taking the 
types of elections into account, I address the question of how and to what 
extent the minority elections increased legitimacy and contributed to the 
channelling of debates, to the creation of ef fective representative struc-
tures, and to the selection of representatives. I also examine whether they 
encouraged voter participation.
Minority Elections in East Central Europe: The Situation in 
Other Countries
In all the countries studied, there are direct elections, albeit in Serbia the 
national minority councils were elected indirectly until 2010. Another 
common feature is the compilation of electoral registers of minority voters. 
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These are administered either by the minority organizations themselves 
(Estonia, Slovenia) or by state authorities (Croatia, Serbia). To a varying 
extent, they all take into account the census data concerning the local sizes 
of minority populations. Autonomous bodies in Estonia and Serbia are 
elected only at the national level by proportional electoral systems,1 while 
Croatia and Slovenia adopted majoritarian systems even at the local level. 
At the same time, each of them faces dif ferent challenges depending on 
the domestic institutional context and the circumstances of the minorities.
In Estonia, the only country that could allegedly build upon prec-
edents dating from the interwar period, the detailed rules on the elec-
tions of minority cultural councils were finally adopted ten years after the 
enactment of the 1993 minority law,2 and their legal status still needs to 
be defined. However, thus far, only small minorities, such as the Ingrian 
Finnish and Swedish communities, were able to elect their own autono-
mous bodies in 2004 and in 2007, respectively.3 Mainly due to the debates 
about citizenship, other minorities eligible for NTA have been limited to 
civil society roles (Smith 2010: 96). Since 1993, Russian organizations have 
made several attempts to establish cultural autonomy for the country’s 
largest national group by far, but these attempts have all failed (Aidarov 
and Drechsler 2011: 45).
In the various former Yugoslav countries, the rise of NTA structures 
could be partially explained by the tradition of Yugoslav self-management. 
Despite the lack of a comprehensive minority law, Slovenia was the first 
to create such a system, in which cultural autonomy was confined to cer-
tain territories. Slovenia’s 1994 law on self-governing ethnic communities 
1 Both countries use the highest averages method, the d’Hondt method for allocating 
seats.
2 Vähemusrahvuse kultuurinõukogu valimise eeskiri [Regulation of the Election 
of Cultural Councils of Minorities] (6 May 2003). <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/
akt/578630> accessed 22 April 2013.
3 ACFC/SR/III(2010)006. Third Report Submitted by Estonia Pursuant to Article 25, 
Paragraph 2 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
(Strasbourg, 13 April 2010). <http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/3_
FCNMdocs/PDF_3rd_SR_Estonia_en.pdf> accessed 22 April 2013.
The Role of Elections in Minority Contexts 167
applies only to small and territorially well-defined non-Slavic communi-
ties, namely to Hungarians and Italians. Within the Slovenian model, it 
is highly remarkable how the community dimension of ethnic belonging 
was reinforced when the Constitutional Court ruled that ‘membership in 
the autochthonous Italian or Hungarian ethnic community is not a matter 
of the will of the individual but the autochthonous community itself ’ 
(de Villiers 2012: 179). Registered minority voters thus have the right to 
elect their local self-governing national communities through direct and 
majoritarian elections (Block Vote electoral system) in those municipali-
ties where they reside autochthonously. At the upper level, each minority 
has an umbrella organization that consists of the delegates of the local 
communities.
In Croatia, pursuant to the 2002 constitutional law on the rights of 
national minorities, minority self-governments can be elected through 
direct and majoritarian elections in those local administrative units where 
the number of minority members reaches a certain threshold, but if they 
fail to meet the criteria they still have the opportunity to elect minority 
representatives. Still, as shown by the results of the 2003 and 2007 minority 
elections, the 2004 by-elections, and the most recent 2011 minority elec-
tions, the number of elected minority bodies has consistently been below 
their possible number. This fact, which highlights the unwillingness of 
minority members to vote for or run as candidates, is probably due to the 
limited capacities and simple consultative roles of minority self-govern-
ments as well as their high dependency on local sources (Petričušić: 2–7).
In the same year (2002), Serbia adopted a law on the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of national minorities, stipulating that national 
minority councils were to be formed by assemblies of delegates from cer-
tain minorities until a new law on their election was passed. Such a law 
was finally approved in 2009 (Tolvaišis 2012). The indirect nature of the 
elections added a new dimension to the rivalry among the Hungarian 
ethnic parties – the Hungarian minority is the largest in Vojvodina. In the 
internal debates, some argued that the elections needed to be held directly, 
based on registers of minority voters. This was how they were organized 
later on (in 2010). In that year, direct and proportional elections were held 
for most of the recognized minorities.
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The Challenge of Drawing Community Boundaries: 
Minorities and their Autonomy in Hungary
Similarly to most of the aforementioned countries, Hungary, in accord-
ance with the 1989 amendments to its constitution, adopted a law on the 
rights of national and ethnic minorities in 1993. The legislation created 
a system of elected MSGs, but due to various problems and deficiencies 
arising during the implementation of the law, it was later amended several 
times. Among these amendments, the 2005 legislation proved to be the 
most relevant, introducing crucial institutional changes.4
Aside from the increasing number of minority civil associations that 
operated after 1989, the creation of legitimate self-governing bodies was 
closely associated with the challenging issue of defining community bounda-
ries in Hungary. While the of ficial figures have consistently been lower than 
the estimates of the minority organizations, the results of the latest 2011 
census do show an unexpected growth of the minority population. Indeed, 
the total ratio of persons belonging to the thirteen of ficially acknowledged 
minorities increased from 5 per cent (approx. 420,000 people) to 6.5 per 
cent (644,000) between 2001 and 2011. In addition, the fact that the esti-
mated number is almost twice as high reveals the extent of uncertainty 
surrounding minority identities in Hungary.
4 See Act 77 of 1993 on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities (as of 25 November 
2005). <http://www.kisebbsegiombudsman.hu/data/files/128317683.pdf> accessed 
22 April 2013. Since 2010 the minority-related legislation has been replaced by the 
new constitution (Fundamental Law) and in accordance with its provisions, by the 
new 2011 law on the rights of nationalities.
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Table 1 The 2011 census data for the various national and ethnic minorities, and the 
number of registered minority voters at the 2006 and 2010 MSG elections
Minority
Native 
language
Nationality 
(ethnicity)
Language used 
among friends 
or in the family
Registered 
MSG 
voters
Registered 
MSG 
Voters
2011 2011 2011 2006 2010
Bulgarian 2,899 3,556 2,756 2,110 2,088
Roma 54,339 308,957 61,143 106,333 133,492
Greek 1,872 3,916 2,346 2,451 2,267
Croat 13,716 23,561 16,053 11,090 11,571
Polish 3,049 5,730 3,815 3,061 3,052
German 38,248 131,951 95,661 45,983 46,629
Armenian 444 3,293 496 2,361 2,357
Romanian 13,886 26,345 17,983 4,404 5,277
Ruthene 999 3,323 1,131 2,729 4,228
Serb 3,708 7,210 5,713 2,143 2,432
Slovak 9,888 29,647 16,266 15,049 12,282
Slovene 1,723 2,385 1,745 991 1,025
Ukrainian 3,384 5,633 3,245 1,084 1,338
Total 148,155 555,507 228,353 199,789 228,038
Note. 2011. évi népszámlálás. 3. Országos adatok (2013), Budapest: Központi Statisztikai 
Hivatal. <http://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xftp/idoszaki/nepsz2011/nepsz_orsz_2011.pdf> 
(accessed 22 April 2013), and for the minority elections: <http://www.valasztas.hu>.
The minorities in Hungary are scattered throughout the country: accord-
ing to previous census data, around 2,500 municipalities (from a total 
of 3,200) have minority inhabitants, but they form local majorities in 
only fifty settlements. These distributions, as well as the rapid growth of 
small diasporas, preclude almost any possibility of territorial autonomy 
arrangements. The traditional minorities are mostly at an advanced stage 
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of linguistic assimilation (Bartha, and Borbély 2006); minority members 
tend to give multiple responses to census questions, often self-identifying 
as Hungarian too. Therefore, clear-cut ethnic boundaries can hardly be 
drawn, while ethnic af filiations may involve various group-based attrib-
utes whose presence and strength vary among minority individuals. Such 
vague ethnic identities have given rise to debates over the nature of ethnic 
af filiation and so-called ‘ethnobusiness’.
Given the uncertain nature of ethnic identities, the dif ferences between 
census data and estimates, and the claims of various ethnic groups, one of 
the most dif ficult tasks in the minority rights field has been to define the 
personal scope of the law, namely the class of persons and communities 
to whom the law was to be applied. The relevant constitutional provision 
had established the right of the national and ethnic minorities to found 
MSGs. Yet, even after the 1993 enactment, it was unclear who should be 
entitled to vote or be a candidate in the minority elections. As the minori-
ties originally rejected any kind of registration of persons with minority 
background, in view of the negative historical experiences (the resettlement 
of Germans and the Hungarian-Slovak population exchange after WWII, 
as well as the discrimination suf fered by Southern Slavs and Roma during 
the Communist era), every adult Hungarian citizen had the right to vote for 
and be elected to the MSGs, while non-citizens established in Hungary also 
had the right to vote until 2006, but they could not be elected. Minority 
elections took place in the same polling stations and on the same days as 
local elections. Until 2005 the law distinguished three types of MSGs at 
local level, including the districts of the capital city. The most prevalent 
type was directly elected through a majoritarian system in which voters 
had as many votes as there were candidates to be elected. The candidates 
with the highest vote totals won the seats. Similar electoral systems were 
chosen for both the territorial and national levels.
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Table 2 Major elements of the Hungarian system of NTA
1994–2006 2006–2014
Personal 
scope
Freedom to choose identity
Minority definition and 
expandable lists of recognized 
minorities and their native 
languages
Elections: every Hungarian voter, 
and de facto non-citizens
Freedom to choose identity, 
registration
Minority definition and expandable 
lists of recognized minorities and their 
native languages
Elections: minority Hungarian citizens, 
at least 30 registered voters. Additional 
requirements for candidates
Local level
Three forms of MSGs
Direct, majority system, Block Vote
One form
Direct, majority system, Block Vote
Territorial 
level
Only in Budapest
Indirect, majority system, Block 
Vote
Every county and Budapest
Indirect, proportional, List PR, 
d’Hondt method
National 
level
Indirect, majority system, Block 
Vote
Indirect, proportional, List PR, 
d’Hondt method
The number of MSGs has increased over time; this may be due to 
growing minority consciousness as manifested in the 2001 and 2011 cen-
suses. On the other hand, it may ref lect another phenomenon. At the 
elections, dif ficulties were encountered in implementing and enforcing 
those provisions that declared the minorities’ right to establish MSGs and 
that minority rights should only apply to Hungarian citizens. As a result, 
the number of votes cast often exceeded even the estimated figures for the 
minority populations. ‘Sympathy votes’ cast by members of the majority 
population – often preferring those candidates whose last names started 
with the first letters of the alphabet – resulted in serious distortions in 
minority public life (Szabó 2005: 225). An even more serious problem – a 
threat to the entire model – was that persons who presumably or obviously 
did not belong to that specific community were even elected to the MSGs. 
Since local minority representatives also elected indirectly the MSGs in 
Budapest and at the national level, these too were af fected by abuses and 
the preferential manner in which minority candidates obtained mandates 
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in local municipalities. This phenomenon and accusations concerning ‘eth-
nobusiness’ assumed importance in intra-community conf licts and in the 
debates between local municipalities and MSGs. The problems underscored 
the necessity for a further comprehensive amendment.
Table 3 The elections of minority self-governments, 1994–2010
Minority 1994–1995 1998 2002 2006 2010
Bulgarian 4 15 30 38 41
Roma 477 768 1,004 1,118 1,248
Greek 6 19 30 34 37
Croat 57 75 100 115 127
Polish 7 33 50 47 49
German 162 272 318 378 424
Armenian 16 25 30 31 39
Romanian 11 33 43 46 71
Ruthenian 1 10 31 52 75
Serb 19 35 43 40 48
Slovak 51 76 108 116 122
Slovene 6 10 12 11 11
Ukrainian 0 5 12 19 23
Note. National Election Of fice, <http://www.valasztas.hu>.
Pursuant to the 2005 law, at the subsequent minority elections in 2006 
and 2010 the right to vote was limited to those Hungarian citizens who 
belonged to recognized minorities and who had declared their af filiation by 
registering in minority electoral rolls. The system was simplified by reducing 
the number of local types of MSGs. The election of the remaining form 
could be held if the number of registered voters of a given minority in a 
municipality reached thirty by the established deadline. As another element 
in the struggle against ethnobusiness, only minority associations that met 
the prescribed criteria had the right to field candidates. This meant that 
independent candidates could not run for election to MSGs. Candidates, 
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furthermore, were obliged to make statements on their knowledge of the 
language, culture and traditions and on whether they had previously been 
members of MSGs in any other communities. The comprehensive amend-
ment created the county-territorial level that had formerly existed only in 
Budapest. The electoral system at that level, as well as at the national level, 
shifted from a majoritarian to a proportional type, whereby each minority 
presented list(s) of candidates and received seats in proportion to their 
overall share of the vote. The d’Hondt method was used for allocating seats.
Despite these restrictions, the election results in 2006 and 2010 and 
some local scandals called into question the success of the comprehensive 
amendment. When one compares the 2001 census results with the 2006 
and 2010 lists of municipalities with at least thirty registered minority 
voters, one finds that, according to the census data, the criterion of thirty 
persons belonging to the same community was not met in 31 and 34 per 
cent of cases, respectively.
The Main Functions of Elections in Practice
Legitimating. Besides the need for legitimate negotiation partners for gov-
ernmental actors, additional factors justifying an elected system of MSGs 
were rivalry among minority civil organizations and the legitimacy deficit.
In view of the subsequent increase in ‘ethnobusiness’, the legitimacy 
of MSGs was doubtful where they had been established in part by non-
minority voters or where their elected members were not af filiated to the 
minority. This was true even though the elections may have been formally 
legitimate in procedural terms. Accordingly, in many cases, the authentic 
minority organizations did not recognize their MSGs as legitimate, even 
though the elections had been legal. According to regional research data, 
the term ‘ethnobusiness’ is understood in a broader sense in minority con-
texts; it refers not only to elected ‘representatives’ who do not belong to the 
specific community, but also to instances in which MSGs are controlled 
by one local family (Pach 2006: 316).
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A choice from alternatives. In every democratic political system, elec-
tions are about choosing among dif ferent alternatives, ideas, candidates, 
parties and strategies. Prior to 2010 the number of candidates to be elected 
was five at local level. An examination of the average number of candidates 
fielded in local minority elections reveals that only in divided communi-
ties was there some form of real competition among organizations and/
or candidates.
Figure 1 The average number of candidates for local minority self-government 
elections, in 2002 and 2006
In this respect, one might ask whether competition is a reasonable 
expectation of minority elections or whether their purpose is simply to 
af firm candidates that have already been selected by the minority organi-
zations. Put dif ferently, should disputes be an inherent aspect of minority 
lives? Can they result in more vitalized communities or do they, on the 
contrary, erode unity and weaken legitimacy, as is often the fear in Hungary?
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In 2010, when the number of candidates that could be elected was 
reduced to four at local elections, the overall picture did not change: in 
most cases there were no more than five candidates – although once again, 
some divided communities like Roma and Romanians presented the highest 
number of candidates. In sum, the choice was rather limited, as it was only 
among divided minorities that the number of candidates was much higher 
than the number of representatives. Moreover, since electoral success was 
not dependent on a certain number of valid votes, the system did not really 
foster participation. Concerning the latter aspect, a rather mixed picture 
has emerged: the level of participation was above the national average but 
registration in minority electoral rolls did not mean that registered voters 
actually voted.
Table 4 Voter turnouts at the elections of local minority self-governments,  
2006–2010 (in percentage)
Minority 2006 2010
Bulgarian 48.16 41.09
Roma 60.48 58.62
Greek 65.18 58.35
Croat 70.30 66.04
Polish 60.90 58.12
German 72.16 70.05
Armenian 62.40 54.22
Romanian 59.19 57.05
Ruthenian 57.75 55.62
Serb 61.99 56.12
Slovak 61.83 64.07
Slovene 75.36 64.78
Ukrainian 47.92 45.36
Note. National Election Of fice, <http://www.valasztas.hu>.
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The type of electoral system. The choice of an appropriate electoral system 
and the manner in which the majoritarian type in certain cases resulted in 
serious distortions and inequalities at national level are of particular impor-
tance in minority contexts. At stake is whether minority elections were 
able to channel intra-community conf licts ef fectively and achieve peaceful 
shifts of power, since especially within divided communities, in the course 
of the elections, prominent opposition forces could win only a few seats or 
none at all. Moreover, organizations on the losing side tended to call for 
the elimination of the entire system of MSGs.5 This issue is underlined by 
further examples of significant distortions caused by a majoritarian system.
The election of the National Roma Self-Government in 2003 proved 
to be the least proportional of all national minority elections. After the 
victory of the coalition of left-wing and liberal parties at the parliamentary 
elections in the previous year, there was an important shift in Roma public 
life. Organizations opposed to Lungo Drom, the largest Roma NGO, 
strengthened. Lungo Drom had made a pre-election agreement with the 
governing right-wing Fidesz and its allies. The two sides had seemed to be 
more or less equal, but in the end the Democratic Roma Coalition won 
the national elections and Lungo Drom won only three seats.
Table 5 The election of the National Roma Self-Government, 2003
Roma NGO Votes Mandates
Democratic Roma Coalition 66,544 49
Lungo Drom 51,855 3
Independent candidate 1,121 1
As already noted, the 2005 comprehensive amendment introduced 
a proportional-type system with a view to ensuring the representation 
of diverse interest groups in such divided communities as the Roma, 
5 Those Roma and Romanian organizations that were excluded from national MSGs 
demanded the abolition of autonomy.
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Armenians or Romanians. A second goal was to ensure that the national 
MSGs would serve as the ‘parliaments’ of minorities by fostering discussion 
and mutual understanding. As a result, the Loosemore-Hanby index – the 
most widely used measure of disproportionality – had decreased in most 
cases. Further, the introduction of a new system had rendered the national 
Roma elections more balanced.
The Armenian minority represents another and more complex 
example, one that illustrates the importance of selecting the appropriate 
electoral system. The small Armenian community has had a presence in 
Hungary since medieval times. The largest wave of immigrants settled in 
Transylvania in the seventeenth century, subsequently becoming highly 
assimilated. In the twentieth century, especially after the two world wars, 
during the final stages of communism, and in the post-transition period, 
many Armenians moved to Hungary from Romania. Accordingly, the 
Transylvanian Armenian Roots Cultural Association was formed in the late 
1990s as an umbrella organization for those who self-identify as Armenians 
and those who have Armenian cultural ties but do not speak the language. 
This predominantly Hungarian-speaking group constitutes the majority of 
Armenians living in Hungary. In the past, it has made serious ef forts to have 
Hungarian of ficially recognized as the native language of the Armenian 
community, doing so even at the expense of the Armenian-speaking group. 
Those who belong to this latter group arrived in the twentieth century, 
mostly from the Soviet Union during the latter part of the Communist 
era. Evidently, they speak the modern Armenian language, continue to 
have links to the community, and maintain close ties with the kin-state, 
Armenia. While the Hungarian Armenians proclaim their right to be the 
authentic representatives of Armenians in Hungary, others argue that they 
are in fact engaged in ethnobusiness. The 2007 election of the national 
Armenian MSG had a more balanced result, with the organizations of 
both groups gaining representation in proportion to their votes.
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Table 6 The election of the National Armenian Self-Government, 2007
Armenian NGO Votes Mandates
Transylvanian Armenian Roots Cultural Association 56 9
Hungarian Armenian Spjurk Diaspora Association 52 9
People of Armenia Cultural Association 43 7
Similarly, in the recent past the national MSG of the Romanians 
tended to be governed by representatives coming from highly assimilated, 
mostly Hungarian-speaking Romanian municipalities despite the propor-
tional system. Native Romanian speakers were outraged when, in 2007, at 
the inaugural session of the national body, most of the elected representa-
tives took the oath in Hungarian, and they also made Hungarian the of ficial 
language of that session. As a consequence, various minority NGOs and 
institutions questioned its legitimacy and opposed ef forts to develop cul-
tural autonomy by taking over educational and cultural institutions. Even 
so, the proportional mechanism meant that representatives of authentic 
Romanian associations could also win seats.
Conclusion
In selecting political representatives, as a general rule, the elected systems 
of NTA increase legitimacy, and may result in more accountable, ef fec-
tive, transparent and potentially more visible organizations that have the 
potential to unite and mobilize communities as much as possible. In prac-
tice, the dif ferent east central European cases, however, show a much more 
complex picture. Despite the lessons to be drawn from both theoretical 
dilemmas and specific practical problems, relatively little is known about 
how choosing an electoral system and the dif ferent aspects of NTA elec-
tions – most notably voter registration – inf luence intragroup relations, the 
ef fective participation as well as the future prospects of the communities, 
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as it is not a well-researched area. The present Hungarian case illustrates 
in particular how legitimate and representative structures can be formed, 
while taking into consideration the sensitive nature of ethnic data, high 
levels of linguistic assimilation, and the internal democracy of the minor-
ity communities.
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